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Abstract
This paper explores a PAC (probably approximately correct) learning
model in cooperative games. Specifically, we are given m random sam-
ples of coalitions and their values, taken from some unknown cooperative
game; can we predict the values of unseen coalitions? We study the PAC
learnability of several well-known classes of cooperative games, such as
network flow games, threshold task games, and induced subgraph games.
We also establish a novel connection between PAC learnability and core
stability: for games that are efficiently learnable, it is possible to find
payoff divisions that are likely to be stable using a polynomial number of
samples.
1 Introduction
Cooperative game theory studies the following model. We are given a set of
players N = {1, . . . , n}, and v : 2N → R is a function assigning a value to every
subset (also referred to as a coalition) S ⊆ N .
The game-theoretic literature generally focuses on revenue division: suppose
that players have formed the coalition N , they must now divide the revenue
v(N) among themselves in some reasonable manner. However, all of the stan-
dard solution concepts for cooperative games require intimate knowledge of the
structure of the underlying coalitional interactions. For example, suppose that
a department head wishes to divide company bonuses among her employees in
a canonically stable manner using the core — a division such each coalition is
paid (in total) at least its value. In order to do so, she must know the value
that would have been generated by every single subset of her staff. How would
she obtain all this information?
Indeed, it is the authors’ opinion that the information required in order to
compute cooperative solution concepts (much more than computational com-
plexity) is a major obstacle to their widespread implementation.
Let us therefore relax our requirements. Instead of querying every single
coalition value, we would like to elicit the underlying structure of coalitional
interactions using a sample of m evaluations of v on subsets of N . To be more
specific, let us focus on the most common learning-theoretic model: the prob-
ably approximately correct (PAC) model [Kearns and Vazirani, 1994]. Briefly,
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the PAC model studies the following problem: we are given a set of points
x1, . . . ,xm ∈ Rn and their values y1, . . . , ym. There is some function f that
generated these values, but it is not known to us. We are interested in finding a
function f∗ that, given that x1, . . . ,xm were independently sampled from some
distribution D, is very likely (“probably”) to agree with f on most (“approxi-
mately”) points sampled from the same distribution.
Procaccia and Rosenschein [2006] provide some preliminary results on PAC
learning cooperative games, focusing on simple games (this is a technical term,
not an opinion!) — where v(S) ∈ {0, 1} for every S ⊆ N . Their results are
mostly negative, showing that simple games require an exponential number of
samples in order to be properly PAC learned (with the exception of the trivial
class of unanimity games). However, the decade following the publication of
their work has seen an explosive growth in the number of well-understood classes
of cooperative games, as well as a better understanding of the computational
difficulties one faces when computing cooperative solution concepts. This is
where our work comes in.
1.1 Our Contribution
We revisit the connection between learning theory and cooperative games, greatly
expanding on the results of Procaccia and Rosenschein [2006].
In Section 3, we introduce a novel relaxation of the core: it is likely (but,
in contrast to the classic core, not certain) that a coalition cannot improve its
payoff by working alone. Focusing on probable stability against likely deviations
saves us a lot of computational overhead: our first result (Theorem 3.1) shows
that any cooperative game is PAC stabilizable; that is, there exists an algorithm
that will output a payoff division that is likely to be resistant against future
deviations by sets sampled from a distribution D, given a polynomial number
of sets sampled i.i.d. from the same distribution. What’s more, the payoff
outputted is feasible: it is no more than v(N) if the core of the game is not
empty; if the core of v is empty, then the total payoff will be no more than the
minimum required in order to stabilize the game. In other words, this algorithm
will pay no more than the cost of stability Bachrach et al. [2009] of the game v.
While coalitional stability is naturally desirable, understanding the under-
lying coalitional dynamics is no less important. In Section 4 we ask whether or
not classes of games are efficiently learnable; that is, is there a polynomial-time
algorithm that receives a polynomial number of samples, and outputs an accu-
rate hypothesis with high confidence. Our main results are that network flow
games [Maschler et al., 2013, Chapter 17.9] are efficiently learnable with path
queries (but not in general), and so are threshold task games [Chalkiadakis et al.,
2010], and induced subgraph games [Deng and Papadimitriou, 1994]. We also
study k-vector weighted voting games [Elkind et al., 2009], MC nets [Ieong and Shoham,
2005], and coalitional skill games [Bachrach and Rosenschein, 2008].
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1.2 Related Work
Aside from the closely related work of Procaccia and Rosenschein [2006], there
are several papers that study coalitional stability in uncertain environments.
Chalkiadakis and Boutilier [2004] and Li and Conitzer [2015] assume that coali-
tion values are drawn from some unknown distribution, and we observe noisy
estimates of the values. However, both papers assume full access to the coopera-
tive game, whereas we assume that m independent samples are observed. Other
works study coalitional uncertainty: coalition values are known, but agent par-
ticipation is uncertain due to failures [Bachrach et al., 2012a,b; Bachrach and Shah,
2013].
Our work is also related to papers on eliciting and learning combinatorial val-
uation functions [Zinkevich et al., 2003; Lahaie and Parkes, 2004; Lahaie et al.,
2005; Balcan and Harvey, 2011; Balcan et al., 2012; Badanidiyuru et al., 2012].
A player’s valuation function in a combinatorial auction is similar to a cooper-
ative game: it assign a value to every subset of items (instead of every subset
of players). This connection allows us to draw on some of the insights from
these papers. For example, as we explain below, learnability results for XOS
valuations [Balcan et al., 2012] informed our results on network flow games.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Cooperative Games
A cooperative game is a tuple G = 〈N, v〉, where N = {1, . . . , n} is a set of
players, and v : 2n → R is called the characteristic function of G. When the
player set N is obvious, we will identify G with the characteristic function v,
referring to v as the game. A game G is called simple if v(S) ∈ {0, 1} for all
S ⊆ N ; G is called monotone if v(S) ≤ v(T ) whenever S ⊆ T . One of the main
objectives in cooperative games is finding “good” ways of dividing revenue: it
is assumed that players have generated the revenue v(N), and must find a way
of splitting it. An imputation for G is a vector x ∈ Rn that satisfies efficiency:∑n
i=1 xi = v(N), and individual rationality: xi ≥ v({i}) for every i ∈ N . The
set of imputations, denoted I(G), is the set of all possible “reasonable” payoff
divisions among the players. Given a game G, the core of G is given by
Core(G) = {x ∈ I(G) | ∀S ⊆ N : x(S) ≥ v(S)}.
The core is the set of all stable imputations: no subset of players S can deviate
from an imputation x ∈ Core(G) while guaranteeing that every i ∈ S receives
at least as much as it gets under x.
2.2 PAC Learning
We provide a brief overview of the PAC learning model; for a far more detailed
exposition, see [Kearns and Vazirani, 1994; Shashua, 2009]. PAC learning per-
tains to the study of the following problem: we are interested in learning an
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unknown function f : 2N → R. In order to estimate the value of f , we are given
m samples (S1, v1), . . . , (Sm, vm), where vj = f(Sj). Without any additional
information, one could make arbitrary guesses as to the possible identity of f ;
for example, we could very well guess that f∗(Sj) = vj for all j ∈ [m], and 0
everywhere else. Thus, in order to obtain meaningful results, we must make
further assumptions. First, we restrict f to be a function from a certain class of
functions C: for example, we may know that f is a linear function of the form
f(S) =
∑
i∈S wi, but we do not know the values w1, . . . , wn. Second, we assume
that there is some distribution D over 2N such that S1, . . . , Sm were sampled
i.i.d. from D. Finally, we require that the estimate that we provide has low
error over sets sampled from D.
Formally, we are given a function v : 2N → R+, and two values ε > 0
(the accuracy parameter) and δ > 0 (the confidence parameter). An algorithm
A takes as input ε, δ and m samples, (S1, v(S1)), . . . , (Sm, v(Sm)), taken i.i.d.
from a distribution D. We say that A can properly learn a function f ∈ C from
a class of functions C (C is sometimes referred to as the hypothesis class), if
by observing m samples — where m can depend only on n (the representation
size), 1
ε
, and 1
δ
— it outputs a function f∗ ∈ C such that with probability at
least 1− δ,
Pr
S∼D
[f(S) 6= f∗(S)] < ε.
The confidence parameter δ indicates that there is some chance that A will
output a bad guess (intuitively, that the m samples given to the algorithm are
not representative of the overall behavior of f over the distribution D), but this
is unlikely. The accuracy parameter ε indicates that for most sets sampled from
D, f∗ will correctly guess the value of S.
Note that the algorithm A does not know D; that is, the only thing required
for PAC learnability to hold is that the input samples independent, and that
future observations are also sampled from D. In this paper, we only discuss
proper learning; that is, learning a function f ∈ C using only functions from C.
We say that a finite class of functions C is efficiently PAC learnable if the
PAC learning algorithm described above runs in polynomial time, and its sample
complexity m is polynomial in n, 1
ǫ
, and 1
δ
.
Efficient PAC learnability can be established via the existence of consistent
algorithms. Given a class of functions C from 2N to R, suppose that there is
some efficient algorithm A that for any set of samples (Sj , vj)mj=1 is able to
output a function f∗ ∈ C such that f∗(Sj) = vj for all j ∈ [m], or determine
that no such function exists. Then A is an algorithm that can efficiently PAC
learn C given m ≥ 1
ε
log |C|
δ
samples. Conversely, if no efficient algorithm exists,
then f cannot be efficiently PAC learned from C.
To conclude, in order for a class C to be efficiently PAC learnable, we must
have polynomial bounds on the sample complexity— i.e. the number of samples
required in order to obtain a good estimate of functions in C — as well as a
poly-time algorithm that finds a function in C which is a perfect match for the
samples. We observe that in many of the settings described in this paper, the
sample complexity is low, but finding consistent functions in C is computation-
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ally intractable (it would entail that P = NP or that NP = RP). In contrast,
the result of Procaccia and Rosenschein [2006] establishes lower bounds on the
sample complexity for PAC learning monotone simple games, but there exists a
simple algorithm that outputs a hypothesis consistent with any sample.
When the hypothesis class C is finite, it suffices to show that log |C| is
bounded by a polynomial in order to establish a polynomial sample complexity.
In the case of an infinite class of hypotheses, this bound becomes meaningless,
and other measures must be used. When learning a function that takes values in
{0, 1}, the VC dimension [Kearns and Vazirani, 1994] captures the learnability
of C. Given a class C, and a list S of m sets S1, . . . , Sm, we say that C shatters
S if for every b ∈ {0, 1}m there exists some vb ∈ C such that v(b)(Sj) = bj for
all j. We write
VCdim(C) = max{m | ∃S, |S| = m, C can shatter S}.
When learning hypotheses that output real numbers (as opposed to functions
that take on values in {0, 1}), the notion of pseudo dimension is used in order
to bound the complexity of a function class. Given a sample of m sets S =
S1, . . . , Sm ⊆ N , we say that a class C shatters S if there exist thresholds
r1, . . . , rm ∈ R such that for every b ∈ {0, 1}m there exists some vb ∈ C such
that vb(Sj) ≥ rj if bj = 1, and vb(Sj) < rj if bj = 0. We write
Pdim(C) = max{m | ∃S : |S| = m, C can shatter S}.
It is known [Anthony and Bartlett, 2009] that if Pdim(C) is polynomial, then
the sample complexity of C is polynomial as well.
3 PAC Stability
In the context of cooperative games, one could think of PAC learning as the
following process. A central authority wishes to find a stable outcome, but
lacks information about agents’ abilities. It solicits the independent valuations
of m subsets of agents, and outputs an outcome that, with probability 1− δ, is
likely to be stable against any unknown valuations.
More formally, given ε ∈ (0, 1), we say that an imputation x ∈ I(G) is
ε-probably stable under D if
Pr
S∼D
[x(S) ≥ v(S)] ≥ 1− ε.
An algorithm A can PAC stabilize a class of functions C from 2N to R if,
given ε, δ ∈ (0, 1), and m i.i.d. samples (S1, v(S1)), . . . , (Sm, v(Sm)) of some
v ∈ C, with probability 1 − δ, A outputs an outcome x that is ε-probably
stable under D. There is an important subtlety here: suppose that we know
the value v(N); by grossly overpaying the agents we could easily stabilize any
game. Under the mild assumption of monotonicity, we can pay each i ∈ N a
value of v(N), which results in a trivially stable payoff division. In addition to
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PAC stability, we must ensure that the total payment to agents is no more than
v(N) if the core is not empty; if the core of G is not empty, then the output of
our algorithm should be no more than the minimal payment required in order
to stabilize the game. Formally, given a cooperative game G = 〈N, v〉 and a
non-negative constant ∆ ∈ R+, we define G∆ = 〈N, v∆〉, where v∆(S) = v(S)
for all S ⊂ N , and v∆(N) = v(N) + ∆. The cost of stability Bachrach et al.
[2009] is
CoS (G) = min{∆ ∈ R+ | Core(G∆) 6= ∅}.
If Core(G) 6= then CoS (G) = 0; indeed, the larger the value of CoS (G), the
greater the subsidy required in order to stabilize G. The following theorem
establishes the poly-time PAC stabilizability of cooperative games, with formal
bounds on the total payoff provided by the outputted imputation1.
Theorem 3.1. There exists an algorithm that, given a cooperative game G =
〈N, v〉 and m i.i.d. samples (S1, v(S1)), . . . , (Sm, v(Sm)) sampled from a dis-
tribution D, where m is polynomial in 1
ε
, log 1
δ
, outputs a payoff division x∗
that (ε, δ) PAC stabilizes G. Furthermore, x∗(N) ≤ CoS (G); in particular, if
Core(G) 6= ∅ then x∗(N) ≤ v(N).
Proof. Let us first consider the problem of computing the cost of stability. It
can be expressed as the following linear optimization problem:
min
n∑
i=1
xi (1)
s.t.
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S) ∀S ⊆ N
If the value of the optimal solution to (1) is at most v(N) then the core of G is not
empty. Now, clearly (1) is not poly-time computable, since the number of con-
straints is exponential. However, givenm i.i.d. samples (S1, v(S1)), . . . , (Sm, v(Sm)),
consider the following optimization problem:
min
n∑
i=1
xi (2)
s.t.
∑
i∈Sj
xi ≥ v(Sj) ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
Unlike (1), (2) is poly-time computable in m and n. Moreover, if x∗ is the opti-
mal solution to (2), then the value of x∗(N) is no greater than the value of the
optimal solution to (1), as (1) imposes more constraints on the target function
than (2). To see why (2) outputs a payoff division that PAC stabilizes G, we
observe that the problem of finding a PAC stable payoff division is equivalent to
the problem of learning an unknown linear function x such that
∑
i∈S xi ≥ v(S)
for all S ⊆ N : since (2) is a consistent algorithm, we know that it outputs a
PAC approximation of x.
1The authors would like to thank Amit Daniely for pointing out some of the basic ideas
outlined in the proof of Theorem 3.1.
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Theorem 3.1 states that any cooperative game is PAC stabilizable, irre-
spective of its own learnability guarantees. While the proof of Theorem 3.1
is simple, it has several important implications. The immediate implication of
Theorem 3.1 is overcoming the computational complexity of finding stable out-
comes. If one is willing to forgo guaranteed stability, it is possible to find payoff
divisions that are likely to be stable. Second, PAC stabilizability is a stability
concept that is founded on observational data: one does not need to know any-
thing about the underlying cooperative game in order to use partial observations
of its values to achieve stability. Finally, the underlying assumptions about the
PAC stabilizability concept are reasonable from a practical perspective. There
are several works that study the stability of cooperative games when certain
restrictions on the coalitions that may form are in place. The most notable
example of such a line of work are Myerson interaction graphs Myerson [1977];
in addition to the game G = 〈N, v〉, we are given a connected, undirected graph
Γ = 〈N,E〉, whose nodes are the players. A coalition S ⊆ N may form only if
the subgraph induced by S in Γ is connected. Several works have shown that
under certain assumptions on the structure of the Myerson interaction graph,
graph restricted coalitional games may be stabilized Demange [2004], exhibit
a low cost of stability Bousquet et al. [2015]; Meir et al. [2013], and have sta-
ble outcomes found in polynomial time Chalkiadakis et al. [2012]; Zick et al.
[2012]. Rather than assuming a certain underlying structure on the game, the
PAC stabilizability approach observes the actual coalitions formed, and assumes
that past events are a good prediction of future agent coalition formation habits;
thus, if all observed coalitions were, say, of size at most 2, it is likely that the
PAC stable payoff division would be stable against pairwise deviations.
4 PAC Learnability of Common Classes of Co-
operative Games
In what follows, we explore the PAC learnability of common classes of cooper-
ative games. Some of our computational intractability results depend on the
assumption that NP 6= RP , where RP is the class of all languages for which
there exists a poly-time algorithm that for every instance I, outputs “no” if I
is a no instance, and “yes” with probability ≥ 12 if it is a “yes” instance. It is
believed that NP 6= RP [Hemaspaandra and Ogihara, 2002].
4.1 Network Flow Games
A network flow game is given by a weighted, directed graph Γ = 〈V,E〉, with
w : E → R+ being the weight function for the edges. Here, N = E, and
v(S) = flow(Γ|S , w, s, t), where flow denotes the maximum s-t flow through Γ,
where edge weights are given by w, and s, t ∈ V .
We begin by showing that a similar class of functions is not efficiently learn-
able. We define the following family of functions, called min-sum functions
which are defined as follows: there exists a list of n-dimensional, non-negative
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integer vectors w1, . . . ,wk. For every S ⊆ N , f(S) = minℓ∈[k]wℓ(S), where
wℓ(S) =
∑
j∈S wℓj . If k = 1, we say that the min-sum function is trivial. We
note that Balcan et al. [2012] study the learnability of XOS valuations, where
the min is replaced with a max.
We define k-min-sum to be the class of min-sum functions defined with k
vectors.
Lemma 4.1. The set of k-min-sum functions is not efficiently PAC learnable
unless NP = RP whenever k ≥ 3.
Proof. Our proof relies on the fact that CNF formulas with more than two
clauses are not efficiently learnable unless NP = RP [Pitt and Valiant, 1988].
Given a set of variables x1, . . . , xn, let us define a set of players
N = {x1, x¯1, . . . , xn, x¯n, y}.
Given a k-clause CNF formula of the form φ =
∧k
ℓ=1Cℓ, where Cℓ is a disjunc-
tive clause containing literals from N (excluding the variable y), we define the
following k + 1-min-sum function fφ : 2
N → {0, 1}:
fφ(S) = min{(|Cj ∩ S|)
m
j=1, |S ∩ {y}|}.
In order to have a value of 1, S must intersect with every Cj on at least one
player; otherwise, fφ(S) = 0. Moreover, S must contain y. In what follows, we
will take truth assignments on x1, . . . , xn and map them to subsets of players in
N , ensuring that fφ(S) = 1 if and only if the truth assignment from which S was
generated from an assignment satisfying φ. We note that it is possible that one
cannot generate a truth assignment for φ from all sets S for which fφ(S) = 1;
for example, fφ(N) = 1, but this is completely uninformative. Given a truth
assignment T for φ, we define its set equivalent to be ST , where ST contains
xi if xi is true in T , otherwise ST contains x¯i. Also, ST contains y. Thus,
fφ(ST ) = 1 if and only if T satisfies φ.
Now, given a set of inputs from φ (T1, φ(T1)), . . . , (Tm, φ(Tm)), we write
T = {T1, . . . , Tm}. For every T ∈ T , we add to the input (ST , φ(T )), and
(ST \ {y}, 0). The sampled point (ST \ {y}, 0) is added to ensure that the
“importance” of y in the definition of fφ is noted by any algorithm that is
consistent with the input. In other words, we can “pretend” that the input of
truth assignments to φ is an input of an unknown k + 1-min-sum function as
defined above, and use it to define a CNF formula that is consistent with φ.
Moreover, if the original input m truth assignments, the number of points we
provide to the algorithm learning fφ is 2m.
Suppose that there exists some consistent poly-time algorithm A for k + 1-
min-sum functions; that is, given a list of m inputs from an unknown k + 1-
min-sum function f , A outputs a list of non-negative vectors w∗1 , . . . ,w
∗
k+1 that
define a k + 1-min-sum function that is consistent on the inputs, and does
so in time polynomial in n, 1
ε
, and log 1
δ
. Then, if we input to this algorithm
the inputs defined above, it will output f∗ defined by w∗1, . . . ,w
∗
k+1, such that
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f∗(STℓ) = fφ(STℓ) on the inputs we designed. Using f
∗, we now show how one
can reconstruct a CNF formula with at most k clauses, such that φ∗(T ) = φ(T )
for all T ∈ T .
Let us define T− to be the set of truth assignments in T that do not satisfy
φ and T+ to be the set of truth assignments in T that do. We assume that we
observe both satisfying and non-satisfying truth assignments (otherwise we can
just output a trivial always true or always false CNF).
First, we claim that there must exist at least one weight vector in the descrip-
tion of f∗ with the value of y set to some positive quantity. Suppose that all of
the vectors w∗1 , . . . ,w
∗
k+1 have the value of y set to 0; then for any truth assign-
ment T ∈ T that satisfies φ, we have (ST , 1) and (ST \{y}, 0); but since none of
the weight vectors of f∗ assign a positive weight to y, f∗(ST ) = f
∗(ST \ {y}),
a contradiction to the consistency of f∗. We conclude that there exists at least
one vector w∗ℓ that has a positive weight assigned to y.
Furthermore, we claim that there must exist at least one vector in the de-
scription of f∗ with the weight of y set to 0. This holds since for every T ∈ T−,
there must be at least one vector w∗ℓ that takes a value of 0 on ST , to maintain
consistency: vectors with a positive weight on y have a positive weight for ST ,
and if all of the vectors defining f∗ assign ST a positive weight, then f
∗(ST ) = 1,
a contradiction to consistency.
Let us take the set of vectors who assign a weight of 0 to y, call that set
W∗; since there exist some vectors that assign a positive weight to y, |W∗| ≤ k.
Furthermore, since there exist some vectors who assign a weight of 0 to y,
W∗ 6= ∅. For everyw∗ℓ ∈ W
∗, we define a clause C∗ℓ such that C
∗
ℓ is a disjunction
of all literals in the support of w∗ℓ ; in other words, if the weight of xi in w
∗
ℓ is
positive, then xi is in C
∗
ℓ , and if the weight of x¯i is positive then x¯i is in C
∗
ℓ .
Let us write the resulting CNF formula to be φ∗. First, since |W∗| ≤ k, the
number of clauses in φ∗ is at most k. Second, if φ(T ) = 1, then f∗(ST ) = 1, and
in particular, w∗ℓ (ST ) > 0 for all w
∗
ℓ ∈ W
∗; thus, φ∗(T ) = 1 as well. Finally,
if φ(T ) = 0, then f(ST ) = 0, and there is at least one weight vector in W∗
that has w∗ℓ (ST ) = 0. The corresponding clause C
∗
ℓ is not satisfied by T , and in
particular, φ∗(T ) = 0. This concludes the proof.
Theorem 4.2. Network flow functions are not efficiently learnable unless NP =
RP.
Proof. Our proof reduces the problem of learning min-sum functions to the
problem of learning network flow functions. Given a min-sum target function
f , defined by w1, . . . ,wk (with k ≥ 3), and a distribution D over samples of N ,
we construct the directed graph Γ = 〈V,E〉 as follows (see Figure 1).
For every weight vector wℓ = (w1ℓ, . . . , wnℓ), we define vertices ℓ, ℓ+ 1, and
n edges from ℓ to ℓ + 1, where the capacity of the edge eiℓ is wiℓ. Finally, we
denote the vertex k+1 as the target t, and the vertex 1 as the source s. Given a
set S ⊆ N , we write ES = {eiℓ | ℓ ∈ [k], i ∈ S}. We observe that the flow from s
to t in the constructed graph using only edges in ES equals f(S); in other words,
flowΓ(ES) = f(S) for all S ⊆ N . Now, given a probability distribution D over
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Figure 1: An example of the reduction from k-min-sum functions to network
flow games, described in Theorem 4.2. Note that we rename the nodes 1 and 4
to s and t, respectively. The description of the original 3-min-sum function is
given in 〈·〉.
2N , we define a probability distribution over E as follows: PrD′ [ES ] = PrD[S]
for all S ⊆ N , and is 0 for all other subsets of E.
We conclude that efficiently PAC learning flowΓ under the distribution D
′ is
equivalent to PAC learning f , which cannot be done efficiently by Lemma 4.1.
Learning network flow games is thus generally a difficult task, computation-
ally speaking. In order to obtain some notion of tractability, let us study a
learning scenario, where we limit our attention to sets that constitute paths in
Γ. In other words, we limit our attention to distributions D such that if D
assigns some positive probability to a set S, then S must be an s-t path in Γ.
One natural example of such a distribution is the following: we make graph
queries on Γ by performing a random walk on Γ until we either reach t or have
traversed more than |V | vertices.
Given a directed path p = (w1, . . . , wk), we let w(p) be the flow that can
pass through p; that is, w(p) = mine∈p we.
Theorem 4.3. Network flow games are efficiently PAC learnable if we limit D
to be a distribution over paths in Γ.
Proof. Given an input ((p1, v1), . . . , (pm, vm)), we let w¯e = maxj:e∈pj vj .
We observe that the weights (w¯e)e∈E are such that w¯(pj) = w(pj) for all
j ∈ [m]. This is because for any e ∈ pj, w¯e ≥ vj , so mine∈pj w¯e ≥ vj . On the
other hand, w¯e ≤ we for all e ∈ E, since we ≥ vj for all vj such that e ∈ pj , and
in particular we ≥ maxj:e∈pj vj = w¯e. Thus, mine∈pj w¯e ≤ mine∈pj we = vj .
In other words, by simply taking edge weights to be the maximum flow that
passes through them in the samples, we obtain a graph that is consistent with
the sample in polynomial time.
Now, suppose that the set of weights on the edges of the graph according
to the target weights we is given by {a1, . . . , ak}, where k ≤ n. Then there are
(k+1)n ≤ (n+1)n possible ways of assigning values (w¯e)e∈E to the edges in E.
In other words, there are at most (n+1)n possible hypotheses to test. Thus, in
order to (ε, δ)-learn (we)e∈E , where the hypothesis class C is of size ≤ (n+1)n,
we need a number of samples polynomial in 1
ε
, log 1
δ
and log |C| ∈ O(n logn).
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4.2 Threshold Task Games
In Threshold task games (TTG) each player i ∈ N has an integer weightwi; there
is a finite list of tasks T , and each task t ∈ T is associated with a threshold q(t)
and a payoff V (t). Given a coalition S ⊆ N , we let T |S = {t ∈ T | q(t) ≤ w(S)}.
The value of S is given by v(S) = maxt∈T |S V (t). In other words, v(S) is the
value of the most valuable task that S can accomplish. Weighted voting games
(WVGs) are the special case of TTGs with a single task, whose value is 1; that
is, they describe linear classifiers.
Without loss of generality we can assume that all tasks in T have strictly
monotone thresholds and values: if q(t) > q(t′) then V (t) > V (t′). Otherwise,
we will have some redundant tasks. For ease of exposition, we assume that there
is some task whose value is 0 and whose threshold is 0. Let Cttg(Q) be the class
of k-TTGs for which the set of task values Q ⊆ R of size k. The first step of
our proof is to show that Ckttg(Q) is PAC learnable.
Lemma 4.4. The class Ckttg(Q) is PAC learnable
Proof. In order to show this, we first bound the sample complexity of Ckttg(Q).
We claim that Pdim(Ckttg(Q)) < (k+1)(n+2). The proof relies on the fact that
the VC dimension of linear functions is n+ 1.
Assume by contradiction that there exists some S of size L, where L =
(k + 1)(n + 2), and some values r1, . . . , rL ∈ R+ such that for all b ∈ {0, 1}L
there is some TTG fb ∈ Ckttg(Q) such that fb(Sj) ≥ rj when bj = 1, and
fb(Sj) < rj when bj = 0. We assume that 0 ≤ r1 ≤ · · · ≤ rL. Let us
write the task set to T = {t1, . . . , tk}, each with a value V (tℓ) ∈ Q; we order
our tasks by increasing value. Now, by the pigeonhole principle, there exists
some task tℓ and some j
∗ such that rj∗ , . . . , rj∗+(n+1) ∈ [V (tℓ), V (tℓ+1)). In
particular, if we write S∗ = {Sj∗ , . . . , Sj∗+(n+1)}, then for every b ∈ {0, 1}
L,
there is some fb ∈ Ckttg(Q) (defined by an agent weight vector wb, and task
thresholds Tb1 , . . . , T
b
k ), such that for all Sj ∈ S
∗, if fb(Sj) > rj it must be
that fb(Sj) > Vℓ, i.e., wb(Sj) > T
b
ℓ . If fb(Sj) ≤ rj then wb(Sj) ≤ T
b
ℓ . Thus,
(〈wb, Tbℓ 〉)b is a set of n-dimensional linear classifiers that is able to shatter a
set of size n+ 2, a contradiction. To conclude, Pdim(Ckttg(Q)) ≤ (k+ 1)(n+ 2),
which implies that the sample complexity for PAC learning TTGs is polynomial.
It is easy to construct an efficient algorithm that is consistent with any
sample from Ckttg(Q) via linear programming.
Given the inputs,
(S1, v1), . . . , (Sm, vm),
let us write the distinct values α1, . . . , αℓ in v1, . . . , vm, and create ℓ tasks with
values V (t1) = α1, . . . , V (tℓ) = αℓ. We observe that since (S1, v1), . . . , (Sm, vm)
represent outputs of a function in Ckttg(Q), it must be the case that ℓ ≤ k. We
further assume that V (t1) < V (t2) < · · · < V (tℓ). We also define tℓ+1 to be
an auxiliary task that has q(tℓ+1) = V (tℓ+1) =∞. Next, we obtain weights for
the players and thresholds for the tasks. For every set Sj it must be the case
that if vj = V (tr), then w(Sj) ≥ q(tr), but Sj does not have sufficient weight to
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complete tr+1. Let σ : [m]→ [ℓ] be the mapping that, for each sample (Sj , vj),
maps Sj to the task that it completed; i.e. the task tr for which vj = V (tr).
In order to find the correct set of weights for tasks and agents we use linear
programming; we require that every set Sj has a weight of at least q(tσ(j)),
but no more than q(tσ(j)+1) (we add a “dummy” variable q(tℓ+1) whose weight
is extremely high to make this requirement hold for the ℓ-th task). Since we
cannot explicitly code the condition w(Sj) < q(tσ(j)+1) into an LP, we add a
tolerance parameter 2−r. We repeatedly run LP (3) with r = 0, 1, 2, . . . until
a feasible solution is found. Thus, we will need to rerun LP (3) at most the
number of bits required to represent the values in the original TTG.
find: w ∈ Rn+,q ∈ R
ℓ
+ (3)
s.t.: w(Sj) ≥ q(tσ(j)) ∀j ∈ [m]
w(Sj) ≤ q(tσ(j)+1) + 2
−r ∀j ∈ [m]
wi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ [n]
qj ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ [ℓ]
The linear feasibility program (3) has n+ ℓ variables and 2m constraints, and is
thus solvable in polynomial time. Moreover, a feasible solution exists; namely,
the one that corresponds to the weights in the original TTG. Thus, there is an
efficient, consistent algorithm for Ckttg(Q).
Let Ckttg be the class of TTGs with k tasks; the following lemma shows
that if we take a sufficient number of samples, a game v ∈ Ckttg can be PAC
approximated by a game v¯ ∈ Ckttg(Q), where Q are the observed values of v.
Lemma 4.5. Given m ≥ k 1
ε
log 1
δ
independent samples
(S1, v(S1)), . . . , (Sm, v(Sm))
from v ∈ Ckttg ; let Q =
⋃m
j=1{v(Sj)}. The event PrS∼D[v(S) /∈ Q] < ε occurs
with probability at most 1− δ.
Proof. First, recall that for every TTG in Ckttg , we have k different task values
{V1, . . . , Vk},
and any set of observed samples will show some Q ⊆ {V1, . . . , Vk}; thus, there
can be at most 2k observed sets of values from the samples. Let us write Dm
to be the probability distribution from which our samples are taken. Given
Q =
⋃m
j=1{v(Sj)}, let Yε(Q) be the event that PrS∼D[v(S) /∈ Q] < ε. We need
to bound the probability (over samples from Dm) that the event ¬Yε(Q) occurs.
Let Sm(Q) be the set of all sequences sampled from Dm for which the observed
set of values is Q.
First, we note that if S1, . . . , Sm generate the values Q, such that ¬Yε(Q)
occurs, then PrS∼D[v(S) ∈ Q] ≤ 1−ε. Next, note that if (S1, . . . , Sm) ∈ Sm(Q)
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then v(Sj) ∈ Q for all j = 1, . . . ,m. Thus,
Pr[(S1, . . . , Sm) ∈ Sm(Q)] ≤
m∏
j=1
Pr
S∼D
[v(S) ∈ Q] ≤ (1− ε)m,
which by our choice of m, is at most δ
2k
:
(1− ε)m ≤ e−εm ≤ e−εk
1
ε
log 1
δ
=
δ
ek
<
δ
2k
Putting it all together,
Pr[¬Yε(Q)] =
∑
Q:¬Yε(Q)
Pr[(S1, . . . , Sm) ∈ Sm(Q)]
<2k
δ
2k
= δ
which concludes the proof.
Using the two lemmas, we are now ready to prove that the class of k-TTGs,
Ckttg , is PAC learnable.
Theorem 4.6. Let Ckttg be the class of k-TTGs; then C
k
ttg is PAC learnable.
Proof Sketch. Let (S1, v(S1)), . . . , (Sm, v(Sm)) be our set of samples. Accord-
ing to Lemma 4.5, we can choose m such that with probability ≥ 1 − δ2 ,
PrS∼D[v(S) /∈ Q] <
ε
2 . We let v¯ be the TTG v with the set of tasks re-
duced to Q; that is v¯(S) = v(S) if v(S) ∈ Q, and is the value of the best task
that S can complete whose value is in Q otherwise. Thus, we can pretend that
our input is from v¯ ∈ Ckttg(Q). According to Lemma 4.4, if m is sufficiently
large, then with probability ≥ 1− δ2 we will output some v
∗ ∈ Ckttg(Q) such that
PrS∼D[v¯(S) = v
∗(S)] ≥ 1 − ε2 . Thus, with probability ≥ 1 − δ, we have that
both PrS∼D[v¯(S) = v
∗(S)] ≥ 1− ε2 and PrS∼D[v(S) = v¯(S)] ≥ 1−
ε
2 . We claim
that v∗ PAC approximates v. Indeed,
Pr
S∼D
[v(S) 6= v∗(S)] = Pr
S∼D
[(v(S) 6= v∗(S)) ∧ (v(S) = v¯(S))]
+ Pr
S∼D
[(v(S) 6= v∗(S)) ∧ (v(S) 6= v¯(S))]
≤ Pr
S∼D
[v∗(S) 6= v¯(S)] + Pr
S∼D
[v(S) 6= v¯(S)] < ε
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4.3 Induced Subgraph Games
An induced subgraph game (ISG) Deng and Papadimitriou [1994] is given by a
weighted graph Γ = 〈N,E〉, where for every pair i, j ∈ N , wij ∈ Z denotes the
weight of the edge between i and j. We letW be the weighted adjacency matrix
of Γ. The value of a coalition S ⊆ N is given by v(S) =
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈S|j>i wij ; i.e.
the value of a set of nodes is the weight of their induced subgraph.
Theorem 4.7. The class of induced subgraph games is efficiently PAC learn-
able.
Proof. Let W be the (unknown) weighted adjacency matrix of Γ. Let us write
eS to be the indicator vector for the set S in R
n. That is, the i-th coordinate of
eS is 1 if i ∈ S, and is 0 otherwise. We observe that in an ISG, v(S) = eTSWeS .
In other words, learning the coefficients of an ISG is equivalent to learning a
linear function with O(n2) variables (one per vertex pair), which is known to
have polynomial sample complexity [Anthony and Bartlett, 2009].
Now, given observations (S1, v1), . . . , (Sm, vm), we need to solve a linear
system withm constraints (one per sample), and O(n2) variables (one per vertex
pair, as above), which is solvable in polynomial time.
Find:(wi,i′ )i,i′∈N (4)
s.t.
∑
i,i′∈Sj
wi,i′ = vj ∀j = 1, . . . ,m
The output of (4) is guaranteed to be consistent, and since a solution exists
(namely, W ), we have a straightforward consistent poly-time algorithm, and
conclude that the class of ISGs is efficiently PAC learnable.
4.4 Additional Classes of Cooperative Games
Before we conclude, we present a brief overview of additional results obtained
for other classes of cooperative games.
Vector Weighted Voting Games : In weighted voting games (WVGs),
each player i ∈ N has an integer weight wi; the weight of a coalition S ⊆ N is
defined as w(S) =
∑
i∈S wi. A coalition is winning (has value 1) if w(S) ≥ q,
and has a value of 0 otherwise. Here, q is a given threshold, or quota. The class
of vector WVGs is a simple generalization of weighted voting games given by
Elkind et al. [2009]. A vector WVG of degree k (or k-vector WVG) is given by
k WVGs: 〈w1; q1〉, . . . , 〈wk; qk〉. A set S ⊆ N is winning if it is winning in every
one of the k WVGs.
Learning a weighted voting game is equivalent to learning a separating hyper-
plane, which is known to be easy [Kearns and Vazirani, 1994]. However, learn-
ing k-vector WVGs is equivalent to learning the intersection of k-hyperplanes,
which is known to be NP -hard even when k = 2 [Alekhnovich et al., 2004;
Blum and Rivest, 1992; Klivans et al., 2002]. Thus, k-WVGs are not efficiently
PAC learnable, unless P = NP .
14
MC-nets: Marginal Contribution Nets (MC-nets) [Ieong and Shoham, 2005]
provide compact representation for cooperative games. Briefly, an MC-net is
given by a list of rules over the player set N , along with values. A rule is a
Boolean formula φj over N , and a value vj . For example, r = x1∧x2∧¬x3 → 7
assigns a value of 7 to all coalitions containing players 1 and 2, but not player 3.
Given a list of rules, the value of a coalition is the sum of all values of rules that
apply to it. PAC learning MC-nets can be reduced to PAC learning of DNF
formulas, which is known to be intractable [Klivans and Servedio, 2001].
More formally, let φ =
∨m
j=1 Cj be a DNF formula, where C1, . . . , Cm are
conjunctive clauses over a set of n variables. The reduction is somewhat similar
to the one used in the proof of Theorem 4.2: given the set of variables x1, . . . , xn,
we define our player set to be N = {1, . . . , n}. We perform the following trans-
formation: for every clause Cj in the DNF we say that a set S ⊆ N satisfies the
clause if i ∈ S whenever xi ∈ Cj , and i /∈ S if ¬xi ∈ Cj . We define a rule of
the form Cj → 1; that is, if S ⊆ N satisfies the clause it is awarded one point.
We can associate a truth assignment for the variables x1, . . . , xn with a set in
N in the natural way: if i ∈ S iff xi is set to true. Thus, if a truth assignment
satisfies the DNF φ, it has a positive value under the MC net; otherwise, its
value is 0. To conclude, any algorithm that properly learns MC-nets will be
easily transformed into one that properly learns DNF formulas.
Coalitional Skill Games: Coalitional Skill Games (CSGs) [Bachrach and Rosenschein,
2008] are another well-studied class of cooperative games. Here, each player i
has a skill-set Ki; additionally, there is a list of tasks T , each with a set of
required skills κt. Given a set of players S ⊆ N , let K(S) be the set of skills
that the players in S have. Let T (S) be the set of tasks {t ∈ T | κt ⊆ K(S)}.
The value of the set T (S) can be determined by various utility models; for ex-
ample, setting v(S) = |T (S)|, or assuming that there is some subset of tasks
T ∗ ⊆ T such that v(S) = 1 iff T ∗ ⊆ T (S); the former class of CSGs is known
as conjunctive task skill games (CTSGs).
PAC learnability of coalitional skill games is generally computationally hard.
This holds even if we make some simplifying assumptions; for example, even if
we know the set of tasks and their required skills in advance, or if we know the
set of skills each player possesses, but the skills required by tasks are unknown.
However, we can show that CTSGs are efficiently PAC learnable if player skills
are known.
5 Discussion
Our work is limited to finding outcomes that are likely to be stable for an un-
known function. However, learning approximately stable outcomes is a promis-
ing research avenue as well. Such results naturally relate approximately stable
outcomes — such as the ε and least core [Peleg and Sudho¨lter, 2007], or the cost
of stability [Bachrach et al., 2009] — with PMAC learning algorithms [Balcan and Harvey,
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2011], which seek to approximate a target function (M stands for “mostly”) with
high accuracy and confidence.
This work has focused on the core solution concept; however, learning other
solution concepts is a natural extension. While some solution concepts, such as
the nucleolus or the approximate core variants mentioned above, can be natu-
rally extended to cases where only a subset of the coalitions is observed, it is less
obvious how to extend solution concepts such as the Shapley value or Banzhaf
power index. These concepts depend on the marginal contribution of player i to
coalition S, i.e., v(S∪{i})−v(S). Under the Shapely value, we are interested in
the expected marginal contribution when a permutation of the players is drawn
uniformly at random, and i joins previous players in the permutation. Accord-
ing to Banzhaf, S is drawn uniformly at random from all subsets that do not
include i. Both solution concepts are easy to approximate if we are allowed to
draw coalition values from the appropriate distribution [Bachrach et al., 2010]
— this is a good way to circumvent computational complexity when the game
is known. It would be interesting to understand what guarantees we obtain for
arbitrary distributions.
Finally, other models of cooperative behavior would naturally extend to a
learning environment. For example, in hedonic games [Aziz and Savani, 2016],
each player reports a complete preference order over coalitions — either ordinal,
e.g. “player i prefers coalition S to coalition T , or cardinal, i.e. each player
assigns a numerical score to each coalition. Given players’ preferences over
coalitions, our goal is to find a coalition structure (i.e. a partition of players into
groups), that satisfy certain notions of stability or fairness. One such solution
concept is Nash stability; a partition π is Nash stable, if no player can leave the
coalition it belongs to under π, and benefit by moving to another existing group
under π. The same line of investigation raised in this work can be applied to the
hedonic setting: given a set of coalitions and some information about them (e.g.
the value that their members assign to them, their order of preference according
to the players etc.), can we find a partition of the agents that will likely satisfy
certain fairness properties?
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